Fellow Bear-Flagger Michael Rappaport has an idea for controlling federal spending: require a supermajority to pass all spending bills greater than 90% the value of the previous year's total. He believes that this threshold will allow a majority to prevent a government shut-down, but give a minority the power to curtail excessive spending.
I see two problems, one substantial and one philisophical.
First, I don't really see how this would reign in discretionary spending. All it would do is require the majority to spend even more to buy enough votes to pass the budget. Part of the reason the Republicans who control Congress haven't cut spending is because their majority in the Senate is so thin that every vote has to be bought. If the Republicans had a five vote majority (rather than one vote), each Senator's support for a spending bill would be worth much less. Requiring a supermajority to pass spending bills would make each marginal vote even more expensive -- particularly if the majority is forced to buy votes from Senators who would prefer to cut spending.
Secondly, I'm not sure I like the idea of undermining the principle of majority rule. I believe that requiring supermajorities is acceptable for some things (particularly at the state level), but I'm uneasy about imposing such a limitation on the will of the majority at the federal level. Would bills that shifted money between departments require supermajorities also, or would they only be needed when the total budget increased? If a simple majority could move money while keeping the total constant (or even 10% lower) budget battles could get very ugly.
The idea is interesting, but I need to consider it more. On the surface it doesn't feel very convincing.
Well, Michael, we already have "undermined the principle of majority rule" at the federal level. The Constitution guarantees certain rights and immunities to all persons. These guarantees are proof against majority rule, because the procedure for amending the Constitution requires not one but three supermajorities: two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress, and ratification by thirty-eight of the fifty states.
In any event, "majority rule" is not a principle. It's mentioned nowhere in the Constitution. It's a myth, germinated out of our procedures for electing legislators.
The question before us is not what's compatible with "majority rule," but what is just, practical, and compatible with the Supreme Law Of The Land. For Congress to institute a supermajority rule for its own operations might not pass the test of Constitutionality. An amendment to the Constitution most certainly would. As for justice and practicality, these are master's-thesis topics in political economy, which the margin of your blog is too small to contain.
FP: Yes, we certainly don't have straight majority rule, and I'm not saying we should. But most of the restrictions we put on the will of the majority are very limited and clearly defined. A change like this would appear to open a huge can of worms.
But like I said, my philisophical concerns could be overcome, I'm not set on them. I think my substantial objects are more serious.
I think budgeting matters are one of the best cases for not allowing government by simple majority. It's just too easy for 50.1% of the population to vote itself the right to milk the other 49.9% dry.